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REPORT

ON THE

PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION.

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REPORT ON THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

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Statistical Table of Turkish-speaking Populations.*

Yakuts - - - - -	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars - - - - -	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars† - - - - -	50,000†	
Crimean Tatars - - - - -	200,000—	
Total in Western Russia and Siberia - - - - -		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus - - - - -		2,000,000+
Bashkirs and Chuvashes - - - - -	2,400,000	
Kirghiz - - - - -	4,692,000	
Turkmans - - - - -	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary) - - - - -	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai - - - - -	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara - - - - -	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara - - - - -	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan - - - - -	1,000,000+	
Total in Central Asiatic Area - - - - -		13,000,000±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia) - - - - -		8,000,000—
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe - - - - -		2,000,000±
Total Turks in the World - - - - -		27,000,000±
Turks in the Russian Empire - - - - -	16,000,000+	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire - - - - -	8,000,000—	
Turks under other Governments - - - - -	3,000,000±	
Total Turks in the World - - - - -		27,000,000±

* Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

† Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarised aliens (mostly Ugro-Finnish).

ADDENDUM.—In 1909 the Moslem Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the Old Régime, exercised authority over the Moslems of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Moslems under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Kirghiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

1. Origin of the name "Pan-Turanian."

Turan is a Persian word. In Persian medieval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The "people of Turan" are the nomads (of many different languages and races) who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago.

Nineteenth-century philologists in Europe appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are "agglutinative" in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass. "Turanian" research was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic speaking peoples of Europe. A medieval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the Ural Region; and during the present war Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home.

Magyar Pan-Turanianism has followed in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. When the Russians remembered their kinship with the Balkan Slavs, and this movement took on a political form, the Magyars looked about for "Turanian" anti-Slav allies, and naturally thought of the Turks. The famous Hungarian savant, Vambéry, was led by this Turanian idea to research among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the Magyars addressed themselves chiefly to the Osmanlis. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1848 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees had found an asylum at Constantinople. In 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in the newly-constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875-8 the Magyars were violently pro-Ottoman, and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman rapprochement was not really racial but political. It rested not on a common consciousness of "Turanianism" but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives have led people in Bulgaria to accept the Turanian label since the Bulgarian Government's intervention against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars are as much Slavs as any other Slavonic-speaking people. The original founders of the Bulgarian State, thirteen centuries ago, were certainly "Turanian" nomads from the steppes, but they have left less trace on the Slavs upon whom they imposed themselves in the Balkan Peninsula than the Normans have on the people of England. Modern Bulgaria is a Slavonic State which has played for its own hand in defiance of Pan-Slav sentiment, and wishes for new sentimental catchwords that conform with its Real-Politik.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is (a) artificial, and (b) European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed

self-interest induces the Bulgar and Magyar to fight his battles, subscribe to his loans, give his young men technical instruction, and supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the other Christian nations of Europe;* *and his principal object in this war is to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences*, whether these are "Central" or "Entente," "Turanian" or "Teutonic."

2. Pan-Turanianism as Pan-Turkism.

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family, but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to anyone. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers, mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey-in-Europe through Anatolia, Trans-Caucasia, Northern Persia and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, Dobrudja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean.† They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs, and the different Turkish dialects are as readily intelligible to all Turks as the different Slavonic languages are to any speaker of one of them. It was therefore only natural that as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

3. Turkish Nationality in the Ottoman Empire.

The consciousness of nationality, like the word "Pan-Turanian," has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national state. It is not called after any people who inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks, but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish states in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their worst rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing-army Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes, and that was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

* This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from "Tekin Alp": "It is a matter of congratulation that the rapprochement between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream."

† See Map facing page 24.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the "home country" of the Ottoman Empire; for while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912-3; the process of centralisation in Asia Minor has been completed by the C.U.P. since the treaty of Bukarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman Army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish Army is organised on the 19th century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Moslem population of the Empire, and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilised on the most threatened frontiers, which till the present war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the *Moslem Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army*—its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers—and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the Centralised Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

4. The Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism.

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms (Czech nationalism for instance) it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a C.U.P. Congress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory, and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debateable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and this "Pure Turkish" movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed, and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutba (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish, and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish Mosques; but they had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.*

* See Appendix 2.

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* See Appendix 2.

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912-3. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, impossibilist and unpolitical. Our chief information about it comes from a book on "The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal" by Tekin Alp,* a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of Albert Cohen, a Salonika Jew.† This illustrates (a) the artificial origins of the movement and (b) its prospects of success. The Salonika Jews are inseparable from the C.U.P., and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the C.U.P. leaders. Cohen evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarisation. But his book has to be used with caution; for though it has been written since the C.U.P. have taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represent the C.U.P. policy. On the whole it is safer to take "Tekin Alp" as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the C.U.P. solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

5. The Effects of the Balkan War.

The Balkan War made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of this disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, emancipation of women, and other really constructive aims, and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Aukaf or Religious Endowments has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressés—the reactionary Moslem ecclesiastical seminaries; and during the present war the Government has challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh-ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active "Unionist" and the fait accompli was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government—calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.‡

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language, but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan States, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from them another idea—irredentism.

"Observers," Tekin Alp writes, "who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the

* Published in German by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915, translated into English by Dr. E. Denison Ross, and circulated officially by the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty War Staff, March 1917.

† By residence only and not by race, to judge by his fore-name. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

‡ See "Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel," by Harry Stuermer, ex-correspondent of the "Kölnische Zeitung" (Payot et Cie., Lausanne). The incident is referred to in Chapter VIII.

“ Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause”—and he proceeds to sketch the life history of several young Macedonian Christians who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent “Tekin Alp’s” personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912–3 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

6. The Policy of the C.U.P.

Irredentism gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey Group, for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the C.U.P.

The C.U.P. were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe, and in this they agreed with Abd-ul-Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means, for while Abd-ul-Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the C.U.P. held that Turkey’s best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” would be proclaimed, all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to the State as free Ottoman citizens—just as Picards and Marseillais and Alsatians rallied to the French Republic after 1789—and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened for the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new *régime* to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey’s expense. Others, like the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognised that secession was impossible, but took measures to defend their own national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralisation, though they co-operated in Parliament with the C.U.P. The C.U.P. found that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralisation and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

7. Turkish Aims in the European War.

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: (a) To purify and strengthen the Turkish Nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and (b) to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by a private group of "Intellectuals," and promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the programme of the C.U.P. *But while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the C.U.P. it is only an instrument.* They will not give up movements that conflict with it, like Pan-Islamism, if these movements can still serve their turn, and they will not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, as it is not paying at present in Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism and the Pan-Turanianism of the C.U.P.* can be summed up as follows:—

- (a) The first aim of the Ziya Bey Group was to purge the *Turkish language* and culture from foreign (*i.e.*, chiefly *Arabic*) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion.

The first aim of the C.U.P. is to purge the *Turkish State* from foreign (*i.e.*, chiefly *European*) influences: extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam; the C.U.P. are far too prudent to do so, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a "language ordinance" making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.†

- (b) The doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The C.U.P.'s method has been to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to "Muhajirs" (Moslem refugees from the provinces lost in 1912–13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Moslems from Krete). Another motive for the atrocities has been to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim—and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Moslem fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.

- (c) "Tekin Alp" seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to "liberating" kindred Turkish populations in Russia and Central Asia.

* Of course some C.U.P. leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form. Dr. Nazim, for instance, is said to have been converted by a book he borrowed from the French Consul-General at Salonika—"Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols à 1405," by M. Léon Cahun, a French savant, whose thesis it is that the "Turaniens" were a brilliant race ruined by the adoption of Islamic culture. But Dr. Nazim was always a doctrinaire, and since the Balkan War he has not been one of the dominating personalities in the C.U.P.

† The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

For the C.U.P. it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hope to compensate or even out-balance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here we have a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians were an alien block separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Tatars of Northern Persia and Russian Trans-Caucasia.

8. Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism.

The opportunism of the C.U.P. appears most clearly in their attempt to drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness, though the two creeds are diametrically opposed to one another. The C.U.P. are devotees to neither, but exploit them both.

Pan-Islamism is not really a religious doctrine. If it were, it would not be so incompatible with Pan-Turanianism as it is. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism are rival political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the 19th century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and Infidels; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were (a) Arabs, (b) uncivilised, and (c) independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilised Moslem populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia. These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Moslem State which already realised their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped themselves to become, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society. The Caliph is the temporal ruler of all good Moslems, as well as their religious head. It is true that this political unity broke down within a century of Mohammed's death, and has never been fully restored. But if the Caliph cannot exercise this universal power, the best alternative is that he should be an independent sovereign, powerful enough to make his wishes felt by the other sovereign states of the world, and this condition is fulfilled by the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople; for the Ottoman Empire is the strongest and most enduring Moslem State there has been since the fall of the Abbasids.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these lines were perceived by Abd-ul-Hamid, and he exploited them cleverly. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful from foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy; and this policy has been continued by the C.U.P. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver succeeded in winning over native sympathies; the Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader; and even the Senussi has made common cause with him during the European war. In Asia the C.U.P. have posed as the liberators of Moslem States caught in British or Russian toils. They sent a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his

neutrality. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they persuaded the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support. They have suggested a triple alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, based on the idea of political independence for Islamic States. The "Holy War" proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh-ul-Islam* in October 1914 has turned out a fiasco, but that is because Turkey has on the whole suffered military defeat. The pre-supposition of the Pan-Islamic policy is Ottoman military prestige. If Turkish armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo, and Teheran, and if the Allies had never threatened Constantinople or captured Baghdad, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political effects, and even now it is by no means bankrupt.

But this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be ruined at once by a logical following-out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire is not an Islamic Great Power but a Turkish National State, and if Turkish Nationalism and Islam are ultimately irreconcilable, that snaps any special moral links between Turkey and the Moslem populations of other States. There is no more salvation for them in Turkey than in Britain or Russia or France, and the C.U.P. have no more claim on them than their established governments. The C.U.P. realise this very well, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. The Allies have laid hold of anti-Islamic and Anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers, and acts of tyranny and repression by C.U.P. officials in the Arab provinces, and these have served excellently as anti-Turkish propaganda in the Arab world. But it would be difficult to convict the C.U.P., as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

The policy of the C.U.P. is to exploit both movements at once, and of the two Pan-Islamism is the more useful to them abroad, but at the same time it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organised militaristic state on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the C.U.P. Congress of October 1911:—

"The character of the Empire must be Mohammedan, and respect must be secured for Mohammedan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organisation, for decentralisation and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. *The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of confirming the Mohammedan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.*"

This illustrates how the C.U.P. try to combine the two ideas in their internal policy, and on which they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities "*may keep their religion but not their native language*," is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Mohammedan religion.

(9) Prospects of Turkish Irredentism Abroad.

On the other hand, in estimating the possibilities of Pan-Turanian propaganda among Turkish populations outside the Ottoman Empire, it may be assumed that no Ottoman Government will pursue a policy in any way prejudicial to the Pan-Islamic

* The same who afterwards resigned over the question of legal reforms.

idea. It may also be assumed now that if the political re-union of the scattered branches of the Turkish race becomes a practical possibility (which it is not at present), this will come about not through Ottoman military victories, but through the internal "break-up" of Russia. This "break-up" of Russia is frankly hoped for by "Tekin Alp"—in fact it is the presupposition of his irredentist programme—but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only looks forward to its being achieved from outside by the armies of Turkey and the Central Powers.

The following are the chief groups of Turkish-speaking population outside Turkey which come into consideration:—

(a) *The Tatars of Kazan (about 1½ Millions.)**

These live along the middle course of the Volga, between Nizhni Novgorod and Samara. They are an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by great Russians on the west and Finnish tribes† on the north and south. They are also intermingled with Russians in Kazan itself. They have been under Russian Government more than three hundred years, and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline at present to follow their lead, and in the last few years their printing-presses have spread their influence widely through the Mohammedan world. *The success or failure of Pan-Turanianism as an Ottoman-Turk irredentist movement largely depends on the attitude which the Kazan Tatars adopt towards it, and this in turn depends upon the political evolution of Russia.*

The Kazan Tatars sent Red Crescent workers and relief funds to Turkey during the Balkan War, but their sympathy is not likely to take a political form. Geography and material interests bind them to Russia, and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for three centuries. They naturally objected to the Tsarist régime, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.‡ But in the present situation they will agree neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets are coming to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated, by independent and probably chauvinistic States, from the Tatars of Crimea and Caucasus. They are almost certain to declare for the Kerensky programme of national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic, for if Russia is successfully reorganised on this basis, they have a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic state containing a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world (about 16 million out of about 27 million altogether, whereas there are probably less than 8 million Turks in the Ottoman Empire.)

In this event, Ottoman Irredentism will collapse. The rallying point of Pan-Turanianism will be not Constantinople but Kazan, and so far from the Anatolian Turks attracting the Tatars into the Ottoman Empire, the Tatars of Russia will attract the Anatolian Turks.

This very desirable solution is chiefly endangered by the possibility of a Russian reaction. A movement now in Russia for centralised military government and the repression of nationalities,

* Including the Tatars of Astrakhan, along the lower course of the Volga.

† Nominally Christian, virtually still pagan, without a culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians—whichever have the final ascendancy in this region.

‡ In internal policy, that is. In foreign policy they are violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desire.

leading in all probability to civil war, might produce among the nationalities a *sauve qui peut*, in which the Tatars would be carried away. They would then turn for support to the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Irredentism might gain the day, with disastrous results to the civilised world.

(b) *The Tatars of Crimea (under 200,000)*

will follow the lead of Kazan.

(c) *The Tatars of Western Siberia (about 50,000)**

will follow the lead of Kazan.

(d) *The Tatars of the Caucasus (over 2,000,000).*

These are also under the influence of Kazan. On the other hand, they have been under Russian government less than a century; they live close to the Ottoman frontier; they have adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (*i.e.*, newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Armenians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914-5, the C.U.P. sent out propagandists to follow the Army, and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national states under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme.

As it was, the Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus, and the only Russian subjects who sided with them were the Adshars, a Moslem tribe of Lazo-Georgian nationality in the district of Batum.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national autonomy for the Caucasus and the occupied districts of Ottoman Armenia has been revived, only this time on the basis of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey. Tatars, Georgians, and Armenians are already wrangling over the delimitation of their national frontiers, and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian rapprochement, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adshars of the Batum district and the Lazos of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase, and in the land question, which is as important in the Caucasus as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar *versus* Armenian is appearing again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward and paralysed by their sectarian division into Shias and Sunnis. If there is a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national claims, they will remain loyal to Russia, and in that case it may be predicted that Baku will in the end supersede Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and perhaps ultimately for all the Turks in the world. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oilfields, has a greater industrial future; and while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point.

* There are also in Western Siberia about 100,000 semi-Tatarised Ugro-Finns.

Kazan and Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asiatic bloc (*via* the Trans-Caspian Railway), are ranged in a circle round Baku, and are in easy communication with it. At the moment, too, the Baku Tatars seem to have produced stronger personalities among their leaders than the Tatars of Kazan. But the prospects of Baku depend upon the achievement of Russian federalism. If there is chaos or repression in Russia, the Tatars of the Caucasus will certainly turn to the Ottoman Empire, in which they could easily be incorporated, for they are almost in touch geographically with the Anatolian Turks, have accepted their literary language, and have not yet outdistanced them in culture. In this event they would vegetate as an outlying province of the Ottoman Empire, and the economic and cultural development of Baku would be cut short.

(e) *The Turkish-Speaking Populations in Persia.*

The migrations from Central Asia, between the 11th and 13th centuries A.D., which carried Turkish-speaking tribes to Kazan, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, also deposited them in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert—especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan.

These Turkish-speakers in Persia have at present no Turkish national consciousness. They are Shias, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Tekin Alp admits that they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers, and, as a matter of fact, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre of the *Persian* Nationalist movement.

Tekin Alp wishes to give the Azerbaijanis a "Turkish soul," and tries to prove that this would strengthen Persia internally. It would really split Persian Nationalism, and drive the Persians proper into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire, and the C.U.P. show no signs of committing such a blunder. Their policy during the war has been to support *Persian* Nationalism in Persia, and to inflame it against the Anglo-Russian *régime*. They are playing for a strong united Persia, freed from Anglo-Russian control, which would then make an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and fall under Ottoman hegemony.

If it became clear that the Anglo-Russian *régime* could not be overthrown, the C.U.P. might then play for the smaller prize, and try to detach from Persia her Turkish-speaking populations. The Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the 16th and 17th centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914-5, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive.

It is also possible that, if Persian Nationalism comes into power, it may adopt a chauvinistic internal policy, and try to Persianise its Turkish-speaking minority. In that case the Azerbaijanis might be roused to a consciousness of being Turks, and desire to cut themselves loose politically from Persia. They would turn first to the Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, and who are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier. The Azerbaijanis and Caucasian Tatars are bound in the end to gravitate in the same direction—whether towards the Ottoman Empire or towards Russia.

(f) *The Turkish-speaking Population in Afghanistan.*

The provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are inhabited by a predominantly Turkish population. They were formerly independent Turkish (Uzbek) Khanates like Khiva and Bokhara. They were only annexed by Afghanistan in 1850-9. The situation is the same as in Persia. Pan-Turanian

doctrinaires might like to rouse these Uzbeks to a sense of Turkish nationality; the C.U.P. would prefer to draw the State of Afghanistan into the Ottoman political orbit.

(g) *The Turks of Central Asia (about 13 million, 12 million of whom are under Russia.)*

Turkish-speaking Central Asia is one of the largest continuous language areas in the world—larger than the Great Russian area and almost as large as the English or the Spanish-speaking area in America. It is bounded roughly by the Volga and Caspian on the west, the Trans-Siberian Railway on the north, the Altai Mountains on the east, the Kwen-Lun and the Pamirs on the south. The whole of it except the Tarim basin ("Chinese" or "Eastern" Turkestan) at present belongs to Russia.* The continuity of its Turkish-speaking population is only broken by some Cossack settlements in the north, and by the Persian-speaking Tajik peasantry and townspeople along the Oxus and upper Syr Darya.

Within this area there are great contrasts of economics and culture. The Bashkirs in the Ural District are in transition from nomadism to agriculture. The Kirghiz, south of them, are still nomads, scattered over vast steppes. The Turkmans of the Trans-Caspian province (such as have survived the Russian conquest) are not only nomads but would still be predatory if they dared.† South-eastward, on the other hand, along the rivers, there is a fairly dense agricultural population. In Ferghana, Samarkand and Tashkend, the Russians have accomplished a great deal of irrigation during the last 50 years, and have successfully fostered the cultivation of cotton. In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organisation has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

To set against these differences, there are powerful factors that make for unity—the common language, a common religion (for all these populations are devout Sunnis), and the common government and better communications that the Russian conquest has brought. The provinces along the Oxus and Syr Darya, for example, which are the heart of Turkestan, are now linked up directly with Kazan by the Russian railway from Orenburg to Tashkend across the Kirghiz Steppe, and with Baku by the Trans-Caspian Railway and the steamship service across the Caspian Sea.

The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before the Russian Revolution; the Revolution has made it imminent.

We have little direct news of the effect which the Revolution has had here. There is said to have been a rising in the autonomous Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, to extort a constitution from the Khans. Religious outbreaks are a more serious probability. Before the Russian conquest Central Asia was a hot-bed of Sunni fanaticism. Khiva and Bokhara, which have never been brought directly under Russian administration, are likely to be fanatical still, and a spark struck here might set the whole region ablaze. If Russia falls to pieces, Central Asia will be the first fragment to break away. Cut the Tashkend and Trans-Caspian Railways, and it is isolated from Russia by a difficult belt of steppe and desert. In the 19th century it took the Tsardom 20 years

* And the Tarim basin will in the end gravitate towards the rest of the Central Asiatic Turkish-speaking area. It rebelled against China in the sixties of last century, and maintained its independence for several years. During the last half century it has been held down by force by Chinese garrisons.

† In the case of the Turkmans, civilisation has produced degeneration. The Russian conquest overtook them in a more primitive stage than most other Turkish stocks in Central Asia.

to traverse this belt and conquer the provinces beyond it. A Russia shattered by the European War and the Revolution would have to postpone its reconquest indefinitely, if not for ever.

The "break-up" of Russia thus opens greater opportunities for Ottoman Irredentism in Central Asia than in any other Turkish-speaking area. In Central Asia Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not conflict with each other.

The whole population is Turkish; the whole population is Sunni; and the present possessor is not an ancient Moslem State, but a recent Christian conqueror. If Russia vanishes as a power from Persia and Central Asia, German-Ottoman diplomacy will certainly make serious efforts to erect a Turkish-Islamic State in Central Asia, which would then be added as a fourth member to the projected Islamic alliance of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan.

Such a state in such an alliance would threaten India in the gravest way. It would create a vast anti-British hinterland behind the anti-British tribes on the North-Western frontier. But if Russia breaks up, the British Empire will have to ward off this danger single-handed.

The Pan-Turanian problem in Central Asia thus gives the British Empire a vital interest in the internal evolution of Russia—a permanent interest apart altogether from the War. Turkish-speaking Central Asia may either remain part of Russia and gravitate towards Baku and Kazan, or break away from Russia and gravitate towards Constantinople, and the latter alternative would directly prejudice our security.

(h) *The Yakuts (about 250,000).*

The Yakuts are a Turkish-speaking tribe thinly scattered over an immense area in the basin of the River Lena, extending to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. They are quite outside the range of any Pan-Turkish movement, for in the first place they are either pagans or nominal Christians, not Moslems; and secondly they are separated from the other branches of the Turkish race by a broad belt of non-Turkish populations—pagan Tungus and Buddhist Mongols.

10. Prospects of Turkification in the Ottoman Empire.

A survey of the Turkish-speaking world outside Turkey seems to show that Ottoman Irredentism will only become a serious possibility if there is a "break-up" of Russia. It remains to examine the other aim of Pan-Turanianism—the Turkification of the non-Turkish nationalities inside the Ottoman frontiers. This depends primarily on the territorial condition in which Turkey emerges from the European War.

(a) *Turkification and the Arabs.*

The Arab policy of the C.U.P. has been their greatest failure in the War. Its extent can be measured by the success of the Arab movement promoted by Great Britain. But it would not be safe to assume that the C.U.P. will let us go on playing such a good card as this without trying to trump it. We cannot trust to their Pan-Turanianism to prevent them bidding against us, even thus late in the day, for Arab support.

We and the Sherif have both given great prominence, in our propaganda, to the supposed designs of the C.U.P. against the Arab nationality. But how far are the C.U.P. really committed to the Turkification of their Arab provinces? It is true that they have appointed the Pan-Turanian feminist, Halidé Edib Hanum, to be principal of a new Government College for women at Beirut, but their object here is to supersede the French and American institutions at Beirut by an institution under Ottoman Governmental control. Their primary aim is thus not nationalist but

political—rather the elimination of external influences from the Empire than the extension of Turkish influence within it at the Arabs' expense.

It is true, too, that Djemal has executed or imprisoned a number of Arab notables in Syria—but this was for treason (actual or prospective) against the Ottoman Government.

Members of the *Turkish* Opposition, too, have been executed or exiled for the same offence; and the C.U.P. evidently do not consider that their severities in Syria can be interpreted convincingly as racial persecution; for when in their defence of the Armenian atrocities they try to prove that they were not setting out to exterminate an alien race, but merely punishing political traitors, they actually refer to their treatment of the Syrian notables to prove this point, on the assumption that in Syria no racial motive can possibly be imputed.

Again, it has been said that the Turks have been deliberately starving the Syrian population to death, but this is only true of the Lebanon Vilayet. The Turks did cut off supplies from the Lebanon and reduce it to submission by famine. But this was not because the Lebanon was Arab, but because it was autonomous. Administrative centralisation is one of the principal aims of the C.U.P., and is sufficient, without the motive of nationalism, to explain their action here. In the rest of Syria there has been great distress, but that is due to the Blockade and to the disorganisation automatically caused by the War. It cannot be proved that the distress has been deliberately produced by the C.U.P. as an anti-Arab move, and they have struck no general blow at the Syrian Arabs like the Armenian massacres or the deportation of the Jews from Jaffa.

On the other hand, there is definite evidence that the C.U.P. are prepared, if necessary, to make concessions to the Arabs. Almost their first act on intervening in the War was to grant the Imam Yahya, in the Yemen, terms which practically gave him the independence for which he has been fighting for years. They have offered similar terms to the Sherif, and this before they have abandoned the hope of being able to crush him by force.* And there have been rumours recently that they mean to promulgate a very generous scheme of autonomy for Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia before they enter into negotiations for peace.

These rumours are likely to be true. "Autonomy" is the card Turkey has always played when her integrity has been in danger; and though in Europe autonomy, once conceded, has generally developed into independence, because it has been guaranteed by the removal of Turkish military control,† in Asia it has so far resulted in the maintenance of the Turkish dominion. The six Armenian vilayets, for instance, were promised autonomy in 1878, when they were under Russian occupation; the promise was endorsed by the Powers, but from that day to this Armenia has had nothing from the Ottoman Government except massacres and coercion. Zeitoun (in the Cilician highlands) and the Lebanon Vilayet (in Syria) were actually in possession of autonomy when Turkey entered the War, but the C.U.P. have been able now to take their privileges away again and garrison both territories with Turkish troops.

These precedents would encourage the C.U.P. to make reckless offers of autonomy to their subject nationalities in Asia, in order to thwart the "annexationist" intentions of the Allies, even if they did not mean to carry out such offers in good faith. But is it safe

* They were ready to recognise his political and ecclesiastical authority in the Hejaz under Ottoman suzerainty, but stated frankly that they could not for a minute consider any claims to the Caliphate on his part—a reservation which shows what importance they still attach to their Pan-Islamic policy.

† *E.g.*, in the cases of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, and Krete.

to assume their insincerity? The paramount object of the C.U.P. is to make the Ottoman Empire an independent military power, strong enough to be the political rallying point of the Moslem World, and in pursuing this object they will not let doctrinaire Turkish Nationalism stand in their way. Turkification for them is merely a means to their object; they will not deliberately persist in it when it turns out to have a contrary effect. And one can imagine circumstances in which they would serve their ultimate object best by adopting the reverse of this policy towards the Arabs.

Assume, for example, that they are unable to recover Mesopotamia and Armenia, but can get peace on the basis of the present war-map. This would leave them Syria and Northern Mesopotamia, with something over five million Arabs, in addition to Anatolia, with something under eight million Turks. They could still play the part of a great power, if within these limits they developed their latent political, military and economic resources, and these would all lie in the Arab areas. Syria and Northern Mesopotamia, not Anatolia, would offer the possibilities of increased population and economic production which a "great power" policy would demand, and the military centre of gravity would also shift into this zone.

Until the present war the Ottoman Empire has always faced, in the military sense, towards Europe, and the Turkish-speaking region of Anatolia has formed the natural base for this European front. But the C.U.P. have now drawn the moral from the Balkan War of 1913 which Austria drew from the Prussian War of 1866. They have made up their minds that the situation on their Western frontier has reached its final equilibrium; that on this side they have nothing more to hope or fear; and that they had better make friends with their former rivals here, and turn their faces resolutely towards the south-east. The rectification of the Thracian frontier in Bulgaria's favour in the autumn of 1915 corresponds morally to the alliance Austria made with Germany in 1878. Austria then hoped to find her compensation in a hegemony over the Balkans; Turkey hopes to find hers now in the leadership of the Islamic world. Austria prepared for the new orientation of her foreign policy by broadening her basis internally; Turkey, having re-oriented herself in a similar sense, may follow this up by a similar reconstruction within. The Austro-Hungarian *Drang nach Osten* rests on Magyar-German Dualism; the Ottoman *Drang nach Osten* may, in the near future, be founded by the C.U.P. on an *Ausgleich* between the Arab and the Turk. Such a policy would not only be dictated by the circumstances; it would commend itself peculiarly to the opportunist temperament of the C.U.P. leaders, *because it would remove the contradiction between Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, and make it possible for them to pursue both aims openly together.* The Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire would be reserved for Turkish Nationalism, and would be a potential focus for all the Turks; the Arab provinces would be made over to their Arab population as a focus for other Arabs; and the two halves of the Empire, linked together strategically and economically by the Taurus and Amanus railway-tunnels, would form between them a Moslem "great power," appealing by its internal constitution and its external strength to the political sympathy of the Islamic world.

It is unnecessary to point out what a menace such a re-organised Ottoman Empire would be to Russia, France and Great Britain. Its greatest anxiety would be that its remaining Arab territories might be taken from it by European powers; its greatest ambition would be to re-unite with these territories the Arab provinces under European government. These provinces would be in direct territorial contact with the autonomous Arab half of the new Ottoman State; most of them would have been ancient

appanages of the Ottoman Empire—the nearest, such as Mesopotamia and the Hejaz, down to as recent a date as the European War. Under these circumstances the Ottoman Empire would inevitably remain profoundly hostile to the British Empire, and would possibly attract towards itself the allegiance of the Arab populations in the British sphere.

The inference, from the point of view of British interests, appears to be that the Arab movement is a double-edged weapon. If we are able to press it home, it will bring us extraordinary advantages; but if Turkey manages to retain any considerable Arab territories—considerable enough, that is, to leave her still strong enough to play the part of an Islamic great power—the C.U.P. will do anything they can to wrest the Arab weapon from us. This is the Pan-Islamic policy, and if we rely on their Pan-Turanianism to restrain them from following it, we are in danger of being the dupes of our own propaganda.

(b) *Turkification in Anatolia.*

The Turkish language possesses great vitality. Wherever Turkish-speaking peoples go, they impress themselves on the landscape; Turkish names of mountains, rivers and towns (monotonous and unimaginative though they are) tend to drive out the ancient nomenclature; and the conquered populations begin to use Turkish as their household language, even though they do not intermarry with the Turks, and though they adhere jealously to their ancestral culture and religion. This process was taking place peacefully in Anatolia before the war. Among the Armenians in the Cilician Highlands it was practically complete—their vernacular language had become Turkish instead of Armenian—and the dialect of the Greek enclaves in the Kaisaria district was in an amazing stage of transition from Greek to Turkish. The first translations of the Bible which the American missionaries found it advisable to make were into the Turkish language, written in Greek and Armenian characters, and that was early in the 19th century. Even without the racial war of extermination which the C.U.P. have waged in Anatolia and Armenia since the spring of 1915—first against the Armenians and now against the Greeks—the Turkish language would before long have become the universal vernacular speech of the Anatolian peninsula, from the Aegean to the Euphrates.

But the recent massacres and deportations have swept away not only non-Turkish languages but non-Turkish cultures. The Turkish-speaking or semi-Turkish-speaking Greeks and Armenians of Anatolia, with their religion, literature, education, industry and economic efficiency, have been removed, and their places have been taken by Muhajirs—Moslem emigrants from the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe, who are perhaps on a higher level than the native Turks of Anatolia, but are also brutalised by hardships and made fanatical by their voluntary exile. The Muhajirs are quite incapable of compensating for the lost Greeks and Armenians as a factor of civilisation; and as (in Anatolia at any rate, whatever may happen in Armenia east of the Euphrates) there seems little prospect of repatriation for the Armenians still surviving in the Mesopotamian exile-camps, the country will presumably have to start after the War from the low-water mark of Turkish barbarism.

The native Anatolian Turk, diluted with the Rumelian Muhajir, will be the material on which the Turkish national movement will have to work. What are its prospects?

The prospects are bad if the Ottoman Government retains sufficient non-Turkish territory to give it still the status of a great power. In that event the C.U.P. will certainly sacrifice the Turkish nation in Anatolia to the demands of military imperialism, as it has always been sacrificed before. But if the Ottoman State is confined to Anatolia, it is possible that these ambitions may be

broken, and the constructive side of nationalism—represented in the Pan-Turanian movement by figures like Halidé Edib Hanum—may then come to the fore.

In that case one may prophesy for a Turkish National State in Anatolia the same course of development which the Balkan nationalities have gone through since their liberation from the Ottoman Empire. There is no reason to suppose that the Anatolian Turk is ultimately less capable of civilisation than the Balkan peoples. There is very little in him of the real Turkish blood from Central Asia; the strongest strain in his race is the aboriginal Anatolian peasantry, which turned Turk *en masse* after the Seljuks had overrun the country in the 11th century A.D. The ancient Anatolian was able to assimilate the civilisation of Greece and Rome; why should his descendents not assimilate that of Modern Europe? Only the process will be slow. The Turk now is much more backward than the Greek and the Serb a century ago, and Islam is a more serious handicap on the growth of a nation than the Orthodox Church. The first stage in a Turkish national regeneration would have to be a struggle against the reactionary Islamic tradition—a real struggle and not the burlesque aping of European anti-clericalism which one finds in “Tekin Alp.” If a constructive movement of this kind really sets in, it will certainly be supported warmly by the Kazan and Baku Tatars and the other Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia; and in fact, if the federalisation of the Russian Empire and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire are both accomplished as a result of the war, the Tatars of Russia will probably play the same beneficent part in the *risorgimento* of the Anatolian Turks that the Russians themselves have played in the history of the Balkan Slavs. This is the only form in which the realisation of the Pan-Turanian idea is either probable or desirable.

11. Conclusions.

(a) The Ottoman Turk has no “Pan-Turanian” sense of kinship with any nation in Europe. The policy of the C.U.P. towards Europe is quite unsentimental,—it aims at the maximum of European assistance to Turkey combined with the minimum of European control.

(b) The power of the Ottoman Empire rests *de facto* upon the Turkish population in Anatolia, and there is a very obvious linguistic kinship between all the Turkish-speaking populations in the world. It is therefore natural that a Turkish national consciousness should arise among the Osmanlis, and that this should be accompanied by a “Pan-Turkish” consciousness as well.

(c) Nationalism was stimulated among the Osmanlis by the shock of the Balkan War, but it is important to distinguish between the doctrinaire nationalists and the C.U.P. The C.U.P. always think in terms of the Ottoman State rather than of the Turkish nationality.

(d) Above all, the C.U.P. will never sacrifice their Pan-Islamic policy either to Turkish Nationalism at home or to Turkish Irredentism abroad.

(e) Turkish Irredentism clashes too much with Pan-Islamism to become a practical policy for the C.U.P., but they might take it up in certain cases in the unlikely event of a “break-up” of Russia.

(f) The “break-up” of Russia would gravely prejudice British interests in Asia; the possibility of a “break-up” depends largely on the attitude of the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and these have two centres—the old centre of Kazan and the newer centre of Baku. The policy of the Kazan and Baku Tatars towards the internal development of Russia therefore affects British interests directly.

(g) For our Arab movement, Pan-Turanianism is good propaganda but nothing more. The C.U.P. will drop the policy of trying to Turkify the Arabs when they find that it is weakening the Ottoman State. They are even likely to offer the Arabs autonomy, and to turn the Ottoman Empire, if they can, into a Turco-Arab State, with a Pan-Islamic and strongly anti-British policy.

(h) If the Ottoman Empire ceases to be a great power, there may be a genuine Turkish national revival in Anatolia. In such a revival, the Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia would probably play the same part that Russia herself has played towards the Balkan Slavs.

This is the only form in which the Pan-Turanian idea is ever likely to be realised.

A. J. T.

Appendix I.—The Kurds.

From the Pan-Turanian point of view the Kurds have considerable importance as a negative factor. They are an Iranian people, speaking dialects of Persian, and their original home is in the mountain ranges which separate the plateau of Persia from the basin of Mesopotamia. South-eastward they are adjoined by kindred mountain populations—the Lurs and Bakhtiariis—and their expansion has been principally in the opposite, or north-westerly, direction.

This expansion has been closely connected with the Turkish migrations. When the Turks made their way from Central Asia into Northern Persia, in the 11th century A.D., they did not dislodge the Kurds, who had occupied the western ramparts of the Persian plateau for about 3,000 years. They avoided the Kurdish mountains, and turned northwards into Azerbaijan, up the valley of the Araxes, and so into Armenia and Anatolia by a route that left Kurdistan untouched. Anatolia was their goal and Armenia their high road, with the result that, after migrations which went on intermittently for five centuries, Anatolia had become the seat of a new Turkish nation, while Armenia was left depopulated and half desolate. This was the Kurds' opportunity. Kurdish tribes drifted into the vacuum which the Turks had made; and they have gradually spread over the lake country of Urmia and Van, and the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, till they have come almost within sight of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

From the point of view of "Pan-Turanian" geography, they have thus possessed themselves of a strategical position. Stretching in a broad arc from a point north of Aleppo to a point east of Baghdad, they form an almost continuous buffer between the Turkish-speaking populations of Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the Arab world on the other. And what is still more important, they combine with the Armenians, and with certain indigenous mountain tribes of Armenia now classed as Kurds,* to cut off the Anatolian (Ottoman) Turks from all the Turks further east. During the Armenian massacres of 1915, a Turkish gendarme said to a Danish Red Cross Nurse†: "First we kill the Armenians, then the Greeks, and then the Kurds"; and so far as the Pan-Turanian idea was a motive for the treatment of the Armenians by the C.U.P., the gendarme was stating the logical consequences of his superiors' policy.

On the other hand, under the old *régime*, before the Ottoman Empire began to be either a centralised or a nationalistic state, the Kurds were the most faithful and favoured supporters of the Ottoman Government, and their expansion towards the north and west was in great part due to Ottoman encouragement.

When the Osmanlis conquered Armenia at the beginning of the 16th century, their main concern was to establish a bulwark against Persia, and the Kurdish tribes served excellently for the purpose. Notwithstanding their Persian dialect, the Kurds have not, and never had, a vestige of Persian national feeling. Their social consciousness is limited by the tribe, the sole object of tribal policy is to evade external control, and in the 16th and 17th centuries the Persian Government, which was near and powerful, seemed a more immediate menace to tribal independence than the distant Ottoman Government at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government was content with a nominal suzerainty over the Kurdish chiefs, and in return the Kurds guarded the Ottoman Empire's Persian frontiers—playing the same rôle here as the Bosniaks and Albanians in the Balkans.

Friction between the Kurds and the Ottoman Government began in the early 19th century, when Sultan Mahmud reduced the semi-independent Kurdish chiefs in Armenia and Kurdistan, and set up the beginnings of an official Ottoman administration in their place.‡ This centralising policy was reversed about 1890 by Abd-ul-Hamid, who hoped to keep his various subjects in subjection by playing them off against each other and weakening them all. Abd-ul-Hamid gave the Kurds rifles, and their chiefs the title of commanders of Hamidié gendarmerie, and let them loose on the Armenians; but Ottoman policy was reversed again in 1908 by the C.U.P., who hoped to regenerate the Empire by unity and internal strength. The C.U.P. attempted to call the Kurds to order, and they had a notable success in subduing the practically independent Milli Confederation built up by Ibrahim Pasha. But they could not call in the arms which Abd-ul-Hamid had given out, though they improved the situation by allowing the Christian population to bear arms too.

As soon, however, as they intervened in the European War, the C.U.P. went back deliberately to Abd-ul-Hamid's policy. They distributed more

* Chiefly in the Dersim highlands, between the two branches of the upper Euphrates.

† They were travelling from Erzerum to Sivas, along the ancient route of the Turkish migrations. (See Blue Book, Misc. 31 (1916), p. 253.)

‡ This was the Sultan who destroyed Ali Pasha of Janina and lost Greece, and it is notable that the C.U.P., in pursuing the same policy from 1908 to 1913, were also successful against the Kurds (breaking up the power of Ibrahim Pasha), but failed to reduce Albania and lost Macedonia.

arms to the Kurdish tribes, encouraged them to take part in the invasion of Azerbaijan, and incited them against the Christians. From April 1915 onwards, the massacres of Armenian convoys in course of deportation were generally carried out by Kurdish hands, reinforced by released criminals and Ottoman gendarmes. But not all the Kurds took the Government's side. In Cilicia, for instance,* the Kurds deplored the treatment of the Armenians, as did the rest of the Moslem population; and in the Dersim highlands the Kurdish or pseudo-Kurdish tribes have given shelter to Armenian refugees from Kharput and elsewhere.

The Kurdish sense of independence has been galled by the Ottoman conscription, and the percentage of Kurd deserters has notoriously been higher than that of Armenians, not to speak of Turks. Many of the Dersimli tribes refused altogether to supply recruits, and the Ottoman military authorities have failed to send effective punitive expeditions against them. At present the Dersim country is a kind of no-man's-land between the Turkish and Russian lines, and many Kurdish chiefs are under Russian influence.

This Russian influence dates from the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, for except in the Erivan district there are practically no Kurds in the Caucasus provinces under direct Russian sovereignty. The occupation of Azerbaijan increased Russia's political prestige among the Kurds, and roughly coincided with the fall of Abd-ul-Hamid and the substitution of a *régime* in Turkey hostile to Kurdish privileges. The Russian Government, as a power making for disorder from outside, was more congenial to many Kurds than the C.U.P. in its first genuine enthusiasm for order and good government.

During the War the partisanship of the Kurds has varied with the military situation. They were pro-Turk when the Turks were on the offensive in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus; they have turned pro-Russian in the Ottoman territories which the Russians have subsequently occupied. The Russian military authorities have treated these Ottoman Kurds with extraordinary favour, have left them their arms, and have connived at their raids, not only upon returned Armenian refugees, but even upon the Russian line of communications. The Kurds were naturally a more congenial element than the Armenians to the Tsarist Government, but the Armenians complain that even since the Revolution the military authorities have continued their pro-Kurdish policy.

The Armenian Volunteers in the Russian Army have taken opportunities of reprisals, and recently it was reported that a punitive expedition by Armenian Volunteers against the Kurds N.E. of Lake Van had resulted in massacres of women and children. It is significant that this alleged atrocity was taken up by the Tatar press of Baku. Hitherto Tatars and Kurds have had little to do with one another; but if Ottoman Armenia becomes incorporated with the Russian provinces of the Caucasus in a federal Russian Republic, it is possible that Kurds and Tatars may work together as an Islamic political *bloc*.

But the future of the Kurds lies less in Armenia (under whatever *régime* Armenia may come) than in Northern Mesopotamia, which is certainly on the eve of economic development. So long as it lay fallow, the steppe-country between Aleppo and Mosul was an Arab domain—though the Kurds drove their flocks there for the winter and Ibrahim Pasha, the last great Kurdish chieftain, made his headquarters at Viranshehr, on the edge of the plain.† But agriculture is now following the Baghdad Railway from Aleppo towards the east, and where Kurd and Bedawi have taken to the land, the Kurd has shown himself so far to be the better man. If therefore the agricultural development of the country proceeds gradually, and if the local population is not swamped by reservoirs of man-power from abroad, Northern Mesopotamia seems destined to become Kurdish land; and here, freed from their tribal tradition and their nomadic habits, the Kurds will be more susceptible to the influences of civilisation.

What will be the policy of the Ottoman Government towards the progress of the Kurds in Northern Mesopotamia, supposing it remains in their hands at the peace-settlement? It is possible that they may try to carry out the threat of the Danish nurse's gendarme; but it is much more likely that they will seek an understanding with the Kurds, on the basis of national autonomy instead of the old tribal independence. The Turco-Kurdish entente, in one form or another, is in the tradition of Ottoman statesmanship, but the future policy of the Ottoman Government towards the Kurds will be a subsidiary consequence of their policy towards the Arabs. If they offer autonomy to their Arab provinces, the growing Kurdish agricultural population will share the benefit; if they decide for repression and Turkification, Kurds and Arabs will suffer alike.

* Misc. No. 31 (1916), p. 498.

† And the Yezidis of Jibal Sinjar, though probably not Kurds by race, had already adopted the Kurdish language.

Appendix 2.—Anti-Islamic Tendencies in the Pan-Turanian Movement.

There are several distinct degrees of opposition to Islam in the Pan-Turanian movement:—

- (a) Ziya Bey's group first came into conflict with Islam over the language question. They probably thought of translating the Koran, &c. into Turkish, because they knew that the translation of the Bible and Christian liturgy into English and German at the Protestant Reformation had been the foundation of the modern English and German national literatures. The idea is not intrinsically contrary to the Mohammedan Religion, any more than the action of Luther and the translators of the Authorised Version was anti-Christian; but it is distinctly contrary to Islamic prejudice, and has therefore not been taken up by the C.U.P.
- (b) The opposition of the Moslem ecclesiastics to the translation of the Koran into Turkish led the Turkish Nationalists into an attack on Islam as an ecclesiastical institution. This secularist movement, too, is partly an imitation of Europe, as "Tekin Alp's" use of the word "clericals" shows; but it also embodies sound and necessary reforms like the secularisation of Education and the Law, and steps in this direction have been taken by the C.U.P. themselves. The chief difference on this head between the C.U.P. and the doctrinaires is that, while the latter trumpet their "anti-clericalism," the C.U.P. try to carry secularisation through with as little friction as possible, and without ever admitting that their measures are anti-Islamic.
- (c) The Nationalists have also started a "pre-Islamic" movement which is only paralleled in Europe by the "Ur-Deutschum" of the Hindenburg wooden idols. They are making a sentimental cult of the pagan Turanian conquerors, like Jenghis Khan and Hulaku (both of whom, incidentally, were Mongols and not Turks). Members of the "Turk Kuji" ("Turkish Power") Society—an association for the promotion of physical culture, probably modelled on the Slavonic "Sokols"—have to take "Turanian" club-names in place of Moslem (e.g., "Oghuz" for "Mohammed"); and a corps of Turkish Boy-scouts has been instituted, who likewise take "Turanian" scout-names, cheer for the "khakan of the Turks" instead of the "Padishah," and carry flags with the Turkish wolf on them, though the representation of living creatures in art is tabu to good Moslems.

Enver is said to be the patron of these boy scouts; a Turkish army order has come into the hands of the British War Office, directing the troops to include the "Grey Wolf" in their prayers; and the Turanian idea seems to have made a certain progress among individual Turks of distinction, even in this fantastic form. For instance, King Hussein's troops have captured, on the corpse of a brother of the Turkish Commandant at Medina, a circular issued by the principal Pan-Turanian Society in Turkey, the "Turk Ojaghi" ("Turkish Family"), in which the following passage occurs:—

"That monstrous figment of imagination which is known as the Community of Islam, and which has for long past stood in the way of present progress generally, and of the realisation of the principles of Turanian Unity in particular, has now entered on a phase of decline and ruin. We need not apprehend from it any further danger to the execution of our hopes and principles. This is abundantly shown by the state of affairs among the Moslems in India"

This circular derives a certain importance from its source and ownership, but there is no evidence that the "Back to Paganism" movement has any influence over the policy of the C.U.P.

Appendix 3.—Text of an open letter addressed to M. Tereschenko, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, by the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council, with reference to the proclamation by Italy of her protectorate over Albania.

"Italy has proclaimed the 'independence' of Albania under her protectorate. If the press may be relied upon, this step taken by Italy was a complete surprise to the diplomatic representatives of the powers allied to Italy. The diplomatic representatives of Russia, England and France had made it clear to the Italian Government that in their opinion the problem of Albania should have been solved after the end of the War in an International Congress. The Albanian problem thus raised by the action of Italy, and the attitude which you, Minister-Citizen, have adopted in the matter as the responsible leader of the foreign policy of the Russian Democracy, induce the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council to address to you this open letter.

"The fate of Albania, which falls under the protectorate of a European Power, recalls in this respect the destinies of Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, Morocco, Afghanistan, and other Mohammedan countries. The history of the Mohammedan peoples of those countries arouses a strong sentiment of sympathy in the hearts of the many millions of free Mohammedans in Russia. And now to the tragedies overtaking the above-mentioned Mohammedan countries there is also added the tragedy of the Albanian people, which is being sacrificed to imperialistic designs of the Italian governing classes. The All-Russian Mohammedan Conference passed a Resolution in Moscow in which it stated its attitude towards the War, 'That this Conference thinks 'the cause of this world-slaughter lies in the imperialistic tendencies of 'European ruling classes, and it protests against that policy wherever it 'exists, because Mohammedans all the world over are victims of European 'imperialism.'

"The fate of Albania is a new illustration of European robbery in the history of imperialism, and again the victim is a mainly Mohammedan people. Hand-in-hand with the Russian Revolutionary Democracy and as a party to its formula of peace without annexations and indemnities based on the right of peoples to decide their own fate, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council expected from you a definite and uncompromising policy towards the Albanian problem.

"But, alas! that hope has not been fulfilled. The Committee expected that the leading organs of the Russian Revolution would have made their powerful voice heard. But that hope also has been falsified.

"On behalf of many millions of Mohammedan Democrats in Russia, we therefore publish this protest.

"Our Executive Committee thinks that in this problem you, as the Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, could take clear and definite action.

"Every people must decide its own fate by a plébiscite. In that way alone can the fate of the Albanian people be settled; whereas you seem to be inclined to solve the Albanian problem by the International Peace Conference. The Russian Democracy was entitled to expect from you a declaration of the Albanian people's right to political self-determination in such a way as not to leave any occasion for doubt.

"Only a policy like that traced above, worthy of the Russian Democracy, could inspire the All-Russian Mohammedan Council with confidence that the men responsible for the high authority of the Russian Revolution correspond to that great formula in problems of foreign as well as internal policy.

"Your dubious and indecisive attitude towards the Albanian problem rouses suspicion and doubt among the Mohammedans of Russia, particularly in consequence of those bitter experiences of centuries past during which the Mohammedans all the world over have learnt the meaning of what is called European justice.

"The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council publishes this protest and considers it absolutely essential to inform you that, in the opinion of the Mohammedan democracy of Russia, the principles of cultural liberty and the right of political self-determination belong not only to the peoples of Europe but also to those of Asia and Africa. The Executive Committee assumes that you are acquainting our Allies with this point of view and that it is being thoroughly comprehended by their governing circles."

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT ON THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

While the Report was in the Press, a new statement on the Pan-Turanian Movement was communicated to the Department of Information.

This statement is a tendencious document. The author of it is attempting to demonstrate that the existence of the Pan-Turanian Movement renders the pro-Arab policy of Great Britain not only futile but positively dangerous to British interests, and he accuses the Turkish Armenians falsely of treachery towards the Ottoman Government. But he also alleges certain facts, which, if true, add considerably to our information.

This factual element in the document may be summarised as follows:—

(i) *Names of personalities concerned in the Movement.*

(a) *Turks.*—Marshal Fuad Pasha; Dr. Riza Tewfik*; Nejib Effendi; Dr. Abdullah Jevdet.

(b) *Russian Moslems.*—Professor Yussuf Akchura; Obeidullah Tashkendi; Kniaz Aziz Bey; Prince Kaplan Zadé; the son of Sheikh Shamil (leader of the resistance to the Russian conquest of Daghestan in the 19th century).

(c) *Germans.*—Dr. Martin Hartmann; Professor von Luschan (Austrian); Rudolf Rotheit; Freiherr von Mackay; Professor (C. H. ?) Becker.

N.B.—The author ascribes as much influence to Professor Hartmann's writings as to M. Léon Cahun's, and states that they are being widely read at present in Turkey. (Hartmann's chief work seems to be contained in two volumes of studies and monographs, entitled "Der Islamische Orient.")

(ii) *Influence of Jews.*

The author states that Hartmann's writings are popular in Pan-Turanian circles because they are anti-Islamic, and ascribes this anti-Islamic tendency in the Movement to the Salonika Jews (descended from Spanish Jews to whom the Ottoman Government gave asylum in the 16th century), and to the Dönmé (a group of crypto-Jewish Salonika Moslems, descended from forced converts of the 17th century). He distinguishes this European Jewish element in Turkey, which is philo-Turk and in sympathy with Turkish Nationalism, from the Jews scattered through Asiatic Turkey, whom he states to be under the influence of American Jewry and to look towards Palestine.

(iii) *Abandonment of the Baghdad Scheme.*

The British successes in Mesopotamia have made the Germans despair of "Berlin-Baghdad." This statement is remarkably confirmed by the independent statement of a distinguished German economist in Dr. Helfferich's entourage.

(iv) *Compensation in Russia.*

On the other hand, the apparent political and military collapse of Russia has led the Turks and Germans to look for compensation at Russia's expense for losses elsewhere.†

* Doubt is cast on his participation by an informant who knows him personally.

† The Germans are certainly paying great attention now to the Turkish-speaking and other Moslem populations of Russia. The new German fortnightly, "Der Neue Orient" (started in April 1917), announces its special interest in them, and gives them many articles and paragraphs.

"Since the Russian Revolution, the [Pan-Turanian] Movement has received an impetus which, in their wildest dreams, the leaders in Constantinople and Berlin had not looked forward to. . . .

"Up to the time of the Russian Revolution the Movement was an idea in the hands of men who . . . had no intention of carrying out the plans they made, as they realised that Russia would stop the Movement on the borders of Persia. But the Russian Revolution has entirely changed the character of the Movement. . . ."

(v) *Berlin-Bokhara.*

The Pan-Turanian policy reckons on the loss (at any rate temporarily) of some or all of Turkey's Arab provinces, but hopes in compensation to build a new Turkish Empire on a Turanian basis, at Russia's expense and in a sphere where Great Britain cannot intervene. Its first objective is the Russian Caucasus; through the Caucasus it aims at the vast Turkish-speaking populations of Russian and Chinese Central Asia; and its ultimate aspirations include Southern Persia, Beluchistan and Afghanistan. Its ambitions thus clash directly with the security of India.

"The Berlin-Baghdad Railway may die, but the Berlin-Bokhara line through Asia Minor and Northern Persia will live. This is the new German ambition."






This new strategic railway, if it is really projected, would presumably follow the existing line from Constantinople to Angora; the next section, from Angora to Sivas, is said to be under construction already; from Sivas the route would run, *viâ* Erzindjan and Erzerum, to join the Caucasian Railway system at Sarykamish. This would at once bring Constantinople into connection with Baku and Tabriz, and from these termini two alternative routes are available: (a) The sea-passage across the Caspian from Baku to Krasnovodsk, and from Krasnovodsk by the existing Trans-Caspian Railway to Bokhara and beyond; or (b) a new railway, starting from Tabriz, running across Northern Persia (where there would be no great engineering difficulties), and joining the Trans-Caspian Railway at Merv.

This all-land route would be a direct menace to the British position in the Persian Gulf, and would seriously threaten India from the West and North-west.

A. J. T.

17.11.17.

The Turanian-speaking Peoples

	Majorities	Minorities
Turks...		 
Ugro-Finns and Samoyeds...		
Mongols and Manchu-Tungusians...	